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Fred Astaire is my ideal man.
Let me explain: My parents lived through the Depression
and the War. They learned as young adults that life is serious,
and that honor and duty are worth more than frivolity and
foolishness. But they also lived through Hollywood’s golden age.
The Fred Astaire of the movies—perfectly tailored, flawlessly
groomed, his regular-guy charm enhanced by beautiful
manners—danced his way through my childhood because my
parents admired him too. And of course they weren’t alone.
Asked to weigh in on Astaire during a tribute, Mikhail
Baryshnikov once confessed that, like every other dancer, he had
to acknowledge that “we are dancing, but he is doing something
else.”1
I know what Baryshnikov meant. To encounter virtuosity is
to be humbled. And having recently re-read Justice Brandeis’s
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, I am still dazzled.
But never mind my reaction, see for yourself:
Those who won our independence believed that the final
end of the State was to make men free to develop their fac-
ulties; and that in its government the deliberative forces
should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as
an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret
of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They
believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth; that without free speech and assem-
bly, discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion af-
1. Alan M. Kriegsman, For Dancers, A Peerless Model, WASH. POST, June 23, 1987,
at D1.
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fords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace
to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a po-
litical duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle
of the American government. They recognized the risks to
which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that
order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment
for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought,
hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that re-
pression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government;
that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that
the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in
the power of reason as applied through public discussion,
they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of
force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies
of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so
that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.2
The rest of us are writing, but Justice Brandeis? Well, he was
doing something else.
THE ISSUE
We have this time advice for judges hoping to lower their
chances of reversal on appeal, an essay considering the right to
film the actions of law-enforcement officers, an investigation into
the story behind a California standard of review, a history of the
early years of the Missouri Court of Appeals, and an article sug-
gesting a way in which to increase the value of oral argument. I




2. Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1929) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Although the procedu-
ral posture of the case required Justice Brandeis to concur in the Court’s opinion,
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 380 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (pointing out that “we may not en-
quire into the errors now alleged”), his view of the First Amendment—“more speech, not
enforced silence,” id. at 377—was later vindicated. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 (holding
that “a statute which . . . purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid . . . assembly
with others merely to advocate the desired type of action” is unconstitutional).
